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Code Names Szejk and Szeryf: The Collaboration of the Belgian Minister Roger Motz with the Polish Secret Services at the Background of Belgian-Polish Economic Relations in the Early Cold War

A Belgian minister and party chairman collaborated with the Polish communist secret services for many years. He did so consciously and received material benefits for passing on information about a vast range of Belgian, European, and international institutions, such as Euratom, the Bilderberg Group, and the Liberal International. At the same time, he gossiped and schemed in order to weaken opponents, such as Józef Retinger. His code name was Szejk and, later, Szeryf, while his real name was Roger Motz.

Roger Motz: A Brief Biography

Roger Motz was born in the Brussels municipality of Schaarbeek in 1904. He studied engineering in Brussels and began a career in industry, but in April 1939 he was elected MP in the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. During the Second World War, he worked in London and Leopoldville

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(Kinshasa) as CEO of Inbel, an information and propaganda center of the Belgian government. In 1945, Motz succeeded Fernand Demets as the president of the Liberal Party, a role he retained until 1953. As a result, he was actively involved in political issues after the war, such as the Social Pact and the Royal Question.²

At the same time, the party chairman was active at the European level. During the war, he often participated in informal talks with European federalists in London. As a result, he was actively involved in the foundation of some of the new European institutions in the late 1940s. In 1947, he was vice-president of the Independent League of Economic Cooperation, a platform led by the Belgian Catholic former Prime Minister Paul Van Zeeland.³ In 1948, the League merged with several other European organizations into the European Movement, with Motz serving as vice-president of its Belgian section. The European Movement proposed the creation of the Council of Europe, which ultimately happened in May 1949. Again, Motz was front and center. He was one of the six members of the Belgian delegation and vice-chairman of the Commission of Economic Affairs.

Motz was even more manifest in another forum: the Liberal International. As party chairman, he was pivotal when the first contacts took place for a meeting of European Liberals in Brussels in June 1946. Motz attended the eventual foundation of the International in April 1947 and led the organization from 1952 until 1958. He also held other offices as part of the role. For instance, he was a member of the assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (from 1952 onwards) and vice-president of the Commission for Investments (1954–1958).⁴

Motz also remained involved in internal Belgian politics. According to his biographer (and fellow party member) Joseph Tordoir, he was thrice offered a ministerial position: in March 1947, August 1949, and April 1954. He refused every time because of the Liberals' weak position or for the sake of his own international career. Motz only became minister of economic affairs when Jean Rey became European commissioner in January 1958 and vacated the office. Less than half a year later, the government fell, and the Liberals went into opposition once more. They again elected Motz as party

2 Jacques Brassinne, "Les libéraux et les problèmes bruxellois 1945–1962," *Courrier hebdomadaire du CRISP*, n° 1219 (1988/34), pp. 3–40.

3 Vincent Dujardin and Michel Dumoulin, *Paul Van Zeeland 1893–1973*, Bruxelles, Éditions Racine, 1997, pp. 153–156.

4 His key role is also recognized in Julie Smith, "Liberals Unite: The Origins of Liberal International," *Journal of Liberal Democrat History*, n° 17, winter 1997–1998, pp. 3–5 and 20.

chairman in December 1958. In the same month, he was granted the honorary title of Minister of State. Motz backed the reform projects of a new generation of Flemish Liberals, resigned in 1961, and paved the way for the transformation of the Liberal Party into the Party for Freedom and Progress (PVV-PLO) the same year. He passed away three years later, in March 1964.⁵

This man, who chaired the Belgian Liberal Party (1945–1953 and 1958–1961), the Liberal International, and served as a minister since 1958, also collaborated with Polish foreign intelligence. However, he cannot be labeled as an ordinary spy. Motz was never in direct contact with Polish intelligence officers but passed on information via a close friend, who worked as a secret agent for the Polish security apparatus (although Motz knew that his information went to Warsaw, and he received material compensation). The Polish secret services assessed some information as precious and valuable, but also often complained of its quality.

It is clear that his collaboration requires more analysis and discussion. This is the aim of this chapter. It complements a chapter in my Dutch book on Polish communist intelligence and Belgium, which discusses Motz's thin file at the Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) in Warsaw⁶ and is due to appear in a Polish (and extended) version in 2022. It will analyze the role of Motz's contact person Jan Hauptman, Motz's political activities towards Poland, and the business companies that Hauptman and Motz set up in collaboration with the Polish secret services in greater detail. These aspects will be examined by means of new archival research, including in the archives of the secret services and of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and the Polish Communist Party PZPR. For other aspects, such as the information that Motz passed on to the Polish intelligence, I refer to my monograph.

Karol Alias Jan Hauptman

Motz's contact person was code-named Karol. However, it is not difficult to ascertain Karol's identity. A report from 1960 in Motz's file provides Karol's real name: Jan Hauptman, a press attaché at the Polish embassy in Brussels from 1944 until 1951 and later the director of Belgarop. Hauptman also has

5 Joseph Tordoir, «Motz, Roger, Jean, Henri», in: *Nouvelle biographie nationale*, Bruxelles, Académie Royale de Belgique, vol. 9, 2007, pp. 271–275.

6 Idesbald Goddeeris, *Spioneren voor het communisme. Belgische prominenten en Poolse geheim agenten*, Tielt, LannooCampus, 2013, pp. 159–175. The file: IPN BU 01739/464.

a file at the Institute of National Remembrance which confirms his double life as an agent.⁷ He is further mentioned in the general overview of Polish intelligence in 1949 which was published by Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski.⁸

Jan Hauptman was born on February 27, 1908, in Warsaw. In 1928, he went to study in Belgium. He first enrolled at the Antwerp School of Economics and the following year at the Political and Economic Department of the University of Brussels (ULB), but he did not complete his studies. Living in Brussels in the 1930s, he worked as a journalist, inter alia as a correspondent of *Przegląd Sportowy* and the Polish Telegraphic Agency (1930–1935), as well as an editor of the Polish diaspora magazine *Narodowiec* (1930–1939) and the Belgian daily *L'Indépendance belge* (1935–1940). During the Second World War, he served in the Polish Army in France (1940)⁹ and Britain (1940–1944). In January 1944, he was discharged from the army and went to work as an official in the Ministry of Information of the Polish government-in-exile in London and as a diplomatic correspondent for the *Glasgow Herald* and the *Yorkshire Post*.

In November 1944, after criticizing the government-in-exile of Arciszewski and Raczkiewicz, he was removed from the Ministry of Information and sent to Belgium as a press attaché. In June 1945, the London government dismissed him from the civil service, but four months later he was given the same job in the same legation, now taken over by the Polish government in Warsaw. He served as press attaché until March 1951.¹⁰ In 1948, he married a young French woman, Hélène Carrère Saint Baer, with whom he had two children.¹¹

7 IPN BU 003195/11/D.

8 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Wywiad polski w roku 1949. Sprawozdanie z działalności*, Warszawa: Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, 2009, pp. 164–166.

9 Frank Caestecker, “Het Poolse leger in ballingschap en de Poolse gemeenschap in het neutrale België (september 1939–mei 1940),” in: *Bijdragen van het Navorsings- en Studiecentrum voor de Geschiedenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog*, n° 15, 1992, pp. 233–255.

10 Because of this position, Hauptman also appears in the Polish Foreign Ministry archives; e.g., in MSZ Z21 T252 W23, Hauptman to the MSZ in Warsaw, Bruksela, 8 April 1947, then being press attaché; MSZ Z8 T117 W8, Stanisław Gajewski – notatka dla Amb. Wierbłowskiego, 4 June 1949, that Hauptman as the press attaché joins the Belgian ambassador in Warsaw on an excursion; MSZ Z8 T262 W20, Polish Ambassador Jerzy Wiechecki to the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland, Brussels, 13 April 1951, informing that Jan Hauptman has stepped down from office. Hauptman also published a book: *La frontière occidentale de la Pologne. Gage d'une paix durable*, Bruxelles, Amitiés belgo-polonaises, 1947.

11 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna, Warszawa, 5 November 1949; podanie o pracę (s.d.); Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960. According

At the same time, Hauptman worked for the Polish secret services. He voluntarily signed a declaration of cooperation with the Second Department of the Ministry of Public Security on 20 March 1946. According to some Polish intelligence sources, he did this “on a material basis in order to remain in his position in the legation;” other reports suggest that he signed it “out of patriotic feelings.”

Initially, he was known as Rozważny (“the circumspect one”); from August 1949 he was also called Sportowiec (“the Sportsman”), but eventually he mostly appears in his files as Karol (“Charles”). In the first year, he provided a whole range of valuable materials on Polish immigrant communities in Belgium. He also recruited two agents. Beginning in mid-1947, however, his activity gradually tapered off, and the possibilities of working along the émigré line decreased significantly. In 1948, he provided almost nothing and in March 1949 he was transferred to the command as KW (*kontakt wewnętrzny*; i.e., internal contact) or to the work along the line of “Pion C.” In April 1949, however, he was rehired and assigned tasks related to political and economic intelligence, which he completed. This allowed him to “re-establish himself as a valuable agent.”¹²

Hauptman was tasked with gathering information on Belgian politics. First, he had to deepen his knowledge of Belgium’s foreign policy: the organizational and staff structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; agreements between Belgium and other countries; international organizations such as the Council of Europe, the “Schuman Plan conferences,”

to reports in that file, he married in 1949; a document from 15 December 1970 in the archive of the Brussels Trade Register (Belgian State Archives, Depot Joseph Cuvelier), however, provides the exact date: 3 February 1949.

- 12 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Raport w sprawie Karola, Warszawa, 10 June 1949; Plan pracy dla ag. Karol, Warszawa, 8 July 1954; Plan spotkania pracownika Centrali z agentem Karol, Warszawa, 10 February 1955. The majority of the reports state that Hauptman recruited Simon and Marin, but according to the work plan of 8 July 1949 he ultimately did not hire Marin due to some objections, while according to Andrzej Paczkowski (*Wywiad polski w roku 1949*, op. cit., p. 159 and 166), Sportowiec recruited only Marin, and Simon was hired by a certain Stefan. Marin was director of the archive of the National Bank in Brussels (Idesbald Goddeeris, *Spioneren voor het communisme*, op. cit., p. 178); Simon was a journalist, an activist within Polish exiles politics, and a valuable agent, who in 1960 worked under the alias of Vespa (IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 6 June 1960). ‘Simon’/‘Vespa’ was solved by Witold Bagiński as Aleksander Szenajch (*Wywiad cywilny Polski Ludowej w latach 1945–1961*, Warszawa, IPN, 2017, vol. 1, p. 273 and 466 and vol. 2, pp. 24–25, 43, 133 and 106). My gratitude to Sławomir Łukasiewicz for this information.

and NATO; Belgium's foreign trade; American policy towards Western Europe; American intelligence in Belgium (known as *Suret  des groupements industriels*); etc. He also received specific instructions; for example, to provide information on political parties and Belgian commercial companies. Tasks assigned to him in the summer of 1949, for instance, included collecting information on the course of the government crisis, and drawing up dossiers for various politicians. He was also told to develop a closer relationship with Colonel Lavry to gain information about the conference of the Ministers of Military Affairs of the "Western Union" in Luxembourg. Similarly, it was suggested for him to have a conversation with a certain "Spryciarz" ("Dodger") and to request of him a brief study on Polish-Belgian trade relations.¹³

Hauptman was able to find out about all this thanks to his many Belgian friends who were influential in journalism and politics. The reports frequently mentioned people such as Jos  Gits (a Liberal and the nephew of the former prime minister and then minister of foreign affairs; before the war, he was the editor of the *La Derni re Heure* daily, while after the war he worked as a counselor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs); and Louis Colot (in 1935–1936, secretary at the Belgian embassy in Warsaw, while from 1949, he was the head of the office of the foreign affairs minister, Paul Van Zeeland.) Additionally, Hauptman counted L on Duwaerts (director of the Belgian press agency Belga) and Carlos Van Bellighen (director of information and press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) among his friends.¹⁴ He also knew a few important politicians, such as the Socialist MP Louis Pi rard, the Christian Democratic Senator Paul Struye, and the Liberal Party chairman Roger Motz.

With some of these people, inter alia Duwaerts and Gits, Hauptman already had friendly or social relations even before the war and, in the case of Colot, Hauptman wrote that their wives were friends. The Polish intelligence headquarters in Warsaw gave some of these informants'

13 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Pierwszy spis jego nowych zada n: Raport w sprawie Karola, Warszawa, 10 June 1949. Concrete instructions: Notatka instrukcyjna..., 30 September 1949. The most extensive list of tasks: Plan nawi zania kontaktu i rozmowy z agentem Karolem, Warszawa, 22 October 1952.

14 The first name Carlos does not occur in the file, but Didier Amaury from the archive of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent me his bio. Carlos Louis Van Bellighen (1910–1993) first worked at the Belgian embassies in Washington and Rio de Janeiro and in 1950 returned to Brussels to set up a *Direction des Relations Culturelles et de l'Information*. In 1953, he became counsellor in Paris, in 1959 general-consul in New York.

cryptonyms: Josse Gits was known to them as “Turk,” Léon Duwaerts was called “Bek,” and Paul Struye was known as “Emir.” This does not mean that they had direct contact with the Polish secret services, however. On the contrary, Hauptman suspected Gits of being active in Belgian intelligence or counterintelligence.¹⁵

A self-evaluation report by the Brussels *rezydentura* (espionage cell) from 1949 confirms this data. According to it, “Sportowiec” had “important connections in the Belgian political world.” It also mentions the names of Motz and Duwaerts and provides some additional contacts: the diplomat Hervé de Gruben, the socialist politician Isabelle Blum, a certain Seyfert, and Colonel Lavry (who was considered for recruitment). Aside from Motz, however, none of these people are mentioned in the Institute of National Remembrance catalog.¹⁶ The 1949 report describes “Sportowiec” as serious and intelligent and his intelligence as very valuable. For example, he provided information on Polish migrants, Polish army troops on the European continent, Belgian politics and economy, the Council of Europe, the American union representative Irving Brown, and the Atlantic Pact.¹⁷

In March 1951, at his own request, Hauptman was dismissed from the position of press attaché and founded the company Belgarop. This settled his intelligence work. As a company director, he strengthened his position among his colleagues and influential friends. In addition, by leaving the embassy he closed the door on possible suspicions. He also became further integrated into Belgian society: first he obtained a permanent residence card and, in 1955, he was also granted Belgian citizenship.¹⁸ Due to his new job, he went to the Commercial Attaché of the Polish People’s Republic in Brussels twice a week. His new position also allowed for easy connectivity. He always had an excuse to visit the Trade Attaché’s Office, where he had contact with Kotlicki (or Gruszów), the attaché’s driver. Kotlicki

15 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Lista bliższych i dalszych przyjaciół moich, before 19 September 1952; Wykaz kontaktów agenta (s.d.); Sprawozdanie z podróży służbowej, Warszawa, 13–17 April 1951; Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, 18 December 1952; Załącznik do planu rozmowy z „Karolem”, June 1955. Some other names that occur in the file: a certain Limborgh from Antwerp, Alfons Klim, a certain Dreze, Max Dauville, Georges Humblet, Charles Moisse, Pierre Warnant, Loridan, Seyaers, Lavry, Prof. Mertens, Meerts, and pilot Van Acker.

16 There is a file of Thierry De Gruben (IPN BU 0716/120), but he was born in 1941.

17 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Wywiad polski w roku 1949*, op. cit., pp. 164–166.

18 According to the reports in his file, he received Belgian citizenship in 1957; a document from 15 December 1970 in the ABH (ARA, DJC), however, gives July 1955 (*grande naturalisation*).

always opened the attaché's door and in this way covertly collected or delivered material. After Kotlicki was partially exposed in 1952, his role was overtaken by "Daniela," another employee at the attaché's, for three years. Subsequently, Hauptman had direct contact with the Brussels resident "Marcin," while after his departure from Brussels in 1957 or 1958 he was contacted by the residence liaison "Roman." In 1952, Hauptman asked the liaison officer for a camera to photograph original documents, but it is not known whether the security service complied with this request.¹⁹

In addition, several control meetings were held with officers sent to Brussels by the headquarters in Warsaw. In December 1952 and April 1955, (Sub)Colonel Mackiewicz, head of Section I of Department VII, held meetings with Hauptman in Brussels; in February 1959, Major Ciech from Section IV of Department I did the same in Paris.²⁰

The headquarters in Warsaw were not always satisfied with Hauptman's work. He became more active after a hiatus in 1948, and between July 15 and September 30, 1949, provided, among others, six reports on the government crisis and a map of the port of Antwerp. Between 1949 and 1953, he wrote an average of about one hundred reports a year. They inter alia related to international conventions and conferences, meetings of Belgian politicians with Western European ones and different moods and opinions prevailing in Belgian political and economic circles. Nevertheless, as early as October 1952 it was noted that the value of his contributions had systematically decreased over the course of the year.

Certain tasks, particularly along the lines of the Vatican and Congo, were poorly performed and information was often delayed. Nevertheless, after the control meeting at the end of 1952, his work improved significantly. He worked out interesting themes and obtained original documents and photocopies. In 1960, the period 1953–1955 was recognized as the best of Hauptman's work. From mid-1957, however, he provided less and less information. In October of that year, the Polish secret services concluded that he was not working systematically but in bursts and that his information was fragmentary and not in-depth.²¹

19 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan pracy dla ag. Karol, Warszawa, 8 July 1954; Łączność, 3 May 1951; Sprawozdanie z podróży służbowej 13–17.4.1951, Warszawa, 3 May 1951; Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 10 January 1959; Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, 18 December 1952.

20 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, 18 December 1952 and Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 10 January 1959.

21 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka instrukcyjna..., 30 September 1949; Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, pp. 4–5; Plan nawiązania kontaktu

What is interesting for this chapter is the fact that the headquarters in Warsaw valued above all the information Hauptman obtained from or via Roger Motz. This data was “in most cases of an informational and intelligence nature,” while information obtained from his other contacts “was most often of a general-informational (press type) nature with details of a non-press nature that were negligible and difficult to verify.”

Moreover, Hauptman met his other contacts rarely and accidentally. However, it was noted that Motz had been “the only source from which he [Hauptman] now draws information” since 1953. In other words, Hauptman “limits his work for us to the role of an ‘intermediary’ between us and Motz.” As early as 1957, it was concluded that he “was being dishonest with us”: he did not want to come to the country and at all costs prevented direct contact between the Polish secret services and Motz.²²

The contact was eventually terminated in 1960. In April 1962, however, Hauptman was again registered as the informant “Aras.” Yet in June 1966, the secret services decided to end the case and transfer it to the archives. “His current capabilities are slim due to the death of the source he used in the past.”²³ Motz had indeed been dead for two years. It is clear that he too deserves more attention.

Motz’s Political Support of Poland

Roger Motz’s involvement did not start with covert plotting in secret backrooms. On the contrary, the extensive quotation above exhibits his immediate readiness “to stand at the head of a Polish-Belgian association, to organize a Polish-Belgian parliamentary group, and to organize excursions of MPs to Poland.” Indeed, Motz was elected chairman of a group of Belgian MPs with an interest in Poland. This Parliamentary Section counted more than forty MPs and senators of all ideological persuasions. It had been set up in the autumn of 1947 by the Polish embassy in an attempt at strengthening ties between the countries, capitalizing on Belgian sympathy for the

i rozmowy z agentem Karolem, Warszawa, 22 October 1952, p. 2; Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, 18 December 1952, p. 3; Plan pracy dla ag. Karol, Warszawa, 8 July 1954, p. 2.

22 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, pp. 4–5; Plan pracy dla ag. Karol, Warszawa, 8 July 1954, p. 3; Notatka służbowa dot. agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 15 June 1957, p. 6.

23 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Postanowienie..., Warszawa, 30 June 1956.

Polish fate during World War II, and gaining more legitimacy. A similar section of Polish legislators was established in Warsaw.²⁴

The Belgian section's first activity was a visit to the Polish People's Republic. Between October 30 and November 6, 1947, nine Belgian MPs travelled to Warsaw, Krakow, Auschwitz, Katowice, and Wrocław and met with, inter alia, Vice-Premier Władysław Gomułka, Premier Józef Cyrankiewicz, and President Bolesław Bierut. The delegation was led by Roger Motz and included Christian democrats, socialists, liberals, and communists. They discussed economic and cultural collaboration, the future of Germany, and the redrawn western borders of Poland. According to the Polish Foreign Ministry, the Belgian parliamentarians saw with their own eyes how the Poles had reconstructed their ruined cities and built a new society on standards that were far above what Western propaganda suggested: for instance, the MPs were surprised that they did not see any Soviet garrisons in the streets. After their return to Belgium, they divulged their experiences. In addition to the communist delegation, liberal members granted interviews to the Belgian press. Roger Motz reported on the visit both to Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak and the Polish chargé d'affaires Edward Bartol. He also organized a press conference and gave a speech before the Belgian Senate.²⁵

In a report from the Polish Foreign Ministry from 1955, the assessment was extremely optimistic: "The results of the travel were, however, undoubtedly positive."²⁶ The Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR), in contrast, was much more critical and noted that the visit was intended to provide great publicity but garnered in fact had little press coverage.²⁷ Edward Gierek, who in the 1970s would become the leader of the Polish People's Republic but at that time was a Polish émigré and communist militant in Belgium, compiled a report on Motz's speech in Parliament. The president of the Liberal Party considered the Polish western border as final; emphasized that he had only seen Poles (and no Germans)

24 MSZ Z8 T643 W49, 70: Notatka informacyjna, s.d., 1955.

25 MSZ Z6 T834 W63, Materiały dot. pobytu w Polsce wycieczki parlamentarzystów belgijskich z senatorem Motzem na czele (1947 r.).

26 MSZ Z8 T643 W49, 70: Notatka informacyjna, s.d., 1955.

27 Archiwum Akt Nowych, KC PZPR 295/XX-19, Polska Partia Robotnicza. Komitet Centralny. Wydział Zagraniczny. Belgia, p. 171 (report from 17 November 1947). See also Idesbald Goddeeris, *De Poolse migratie in België 1945-1950. Politieke mobilisatie en sociale differentiatie*, Amsterdam, Aksant, 2005, p. 92 and Idesbald Goddeeris, *Polonia belgijska w pierwszych latach po II wojnie światowej*, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Semper, 2005, p. 79.

in Poland's western provinces; thought that nothing should prevent Belgium from strengthening trade relations with Poland; and distinguished between constructive and destructive opposition. Motz also aired criticism of the young Polish People's Republic. He stated that censorship was too strict and the security services were too strong.²⁸ Some delegation members met with the head of the Krakow department of the secret services, who to their great surprise had been invited to their reception by the governor of Krakow.²⁹

A return visit was postponed: Belgium subscribed to the Marshall Plan from 1948 onwards and faced a political crisis related to the position of King Leopold III. It was only in March 1951 that ten Polish MPs traveled to Belgium in order to discuss further economic and cultural collaboration, Germany's demilitarization, and the need for peace and neutrality. Again, Motz was actively involved. He chaired the meeting with nine Belgian MPs and gave a speech at a dinner with the presidents of the Chamber and the Senate. He also acted as spokesman to the Belgian media and was quoted in *La Dernière Heure*, pointing out that the Polish MPs did not wish to make any statements that may contradict both countries' official viewpoints. The visit did not seem particularly groundbreaking. In fact, *Le Soir* ran the headline: "*Des discussions stériles*" ("Sterile Discussions").³⁰

A new Belgian parliamentary delegation went back to Poland in October 1955. This time, they visited Gdansk, Gdynia, Szczecin, and Krakow and Warsaw again. Once more, Motz was the driving force. He discussed the trip during two visits to the Polish embassy in Brussels on July 19 and 22; corresponded from his holiday address in Switzerland; and served as the delegation's chairman. He also provided a debrief of the journey at the Polish embassy and promised to discuss the issue of Belgian export trade to Poland with the minister of foreign trade. Afterwards, he reported to the Polish embassy that the minister agreed to a visit of Polish trade representatives to Belgium.³¹

It is unclear whether this visit ever took place, but in December 1957, a new delegation of Polish MPs came to Belgium. Motz was involved in the organization from at least August 1957 and again chaired a session in the Belgian Senate on December 12. This was his last parliamentary exchange,

28 IPN BU 00231/309, tom 1, p. 128.

29 MSZ Z6 T834 W63, Notatka, November 1947.

30 MSZ Z8 T261 W20, Wizyta parlamentarzystów polskich w Belgii 1951 and MSZ Z21 T 239 W23, Komunikaty, depesze, artykuły.

31 MSZ Z8 T643 W49, Wizyta parlamentarzystów belgijskich w Polsce, 1955.

however: the next meeting took place in Poland in September 1964, half a year after Motz's death.³²

Just a couple of months before he passed away, Motz also became a board member of the most prominent organization binding Brussels and Warsaw: the Belgian-Polish Friendship Association (*Les Amitiés belgo-polonaises*; *Towarzystwo Przyjaźni Belgijsko-Polskiej*). This association was founded in January 1947 by Jan Hauptman – the previously-mentioned agent who worked under the cover of press attaché – and some Belgian sympathizers such as the journalist Roger Crouquet and the liberal MP Ernest Demuyter (who became the association's president). It included politicians from other parties, such as the Socialists Henri Rolin and Louis Piérard and the Christian Democrat Paul Struye. Inspired by Belgian sister associations for the Soviet Union established in 1929 and again in 1945, and more broadly by similar organizations abroad,³³ the *Amitiés* fostered contact between the countries by means of exhibitions, lectures, and other events. From 1952 to 1959, it also published the review *La Pologne d'aujourd'hui* with articles on Polish politics, economics, society, and culture.

In 1960, the association collapsed after a Polish condemnation in the UN of Belgium's role in Congo and the resignation of Demuyter.³⁴ The communist activist Isabelle Blume assumed the coordination, but because she was also active in friendship organizations with other communist countries, the Polish *Amitiés*'s activities decreased dramatically. The Polish embassy therefore reorganized its structure and composition at the end of 1963. Motz then became vice-president.³⁵

This was not surprising. Motz had not only served as the chairman of the Belgian-Polish parliamentary section; he was also active behind the scenes. The political reports that the Polish embassy in Brussels sent to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw regularly mention how Motz had talked

32 MSZ Z17 T56 W6, Wymiana parlamentarzystów.

33 Eva Schandevyl, *Tussen revolutie en conformisme. Het engagement en de netwerken van linkse intellectuelen in België 1918–1956*, Brussel, Academic and Scientific Publishers, 2011, pp. 277–278.

34 Maria Pasztor, “Polsko-belgijska ‘wojna’ o Kongo (1960–1963)”, *Polska 1944/45–1989. Studia i materiały*, n° 17, 2019, pp. 135–160.

35 Hélène Oger wrote a MA thesis about *Les Amitiés belgo-polonaises*, based on its review (that was renamed *La Pologne d'aujourd'hui* only in 1954): Oger Hélène, *Les Amitiés belgo-polonaises. Analyse de la revue éditée entre 1952 et 1959 par l'AS-BL éponyme*, Université catholique de Louvain, 2011. One finds more information, especially about the first months of its existence in 1947, the disintegration in 1960, and the reorganization three years later in MSZ Z17 T76 W9, Tow. Przyjaźni Belgijsko-Polskiej.

to Polish diplomats during receptions, meetings, and even a breakfast at the Polish embassy.³⁶ The Liberal Party chairman even seems to have been a better and more frequent source of intelligence than Belgian communists and other politicians.

Although further research in the archives of other Eastern European countries has yet to confirm this, it seems that Poland was Motz's priority and that the rest of the Eastern Bloc did not particularly interest him. When the Yugoslavian embassy founded a Belgian-Yugoslavian parliamentary group and offered its presidency to Motz, he refused, while other politicians sympathizing with Poland, such as Struye and Piérard, joined the new group.³⁷ It remains unclear exactly why Poland fascinated him. It may have been due to his acquaintance with Jan Hauptman and other Polish exiles in London during the Second World War. However, the sparking of his interest may also precede the war. In November 1947, the Polish embassy noted that Motz had already travelled to Poland seven times.³⁸ During an excursion in 1925, he visited the disputed Polish-Lithuanian border and, "leading some drunk students," moved two boundary markers to "expand" Lithuanian territory by a few dozen meters. The border patrol held the group for several hours. Some Belgian newspapers covered the event, and Motz gained popularity among university youth.³⁹

A Liberal politician's far-reaching sympathy with a communist country might seem paradoxical. However, it was not exceptional. In September 1948, the Polish embassy in Brussels noted that relations with the Belgian Liberals were "very good, with some understandable caution on the part of the Liberal Party."⁴⁰ Five years later, it reported that "the last period was used to expand relations with the Liberal Party of this country (e.g., lunch for party chairman Liebaert and a visit to the mayor of Ostend). As part of the activities of the Belgian-Polish Friendship Society, we have repeatedly sought contact with Liberal politicians, such as MP Destenay in Liège or

36 For instance, in 1948, 1952, and 1954: MSZ Z6 T846 W64, Raport polityczny nr 21, 2 July 1948; MSZ Z8 W25 T317, Raport polityczny nr 58, 4 February 1952; and MSZ Z8 T532 W41, Radca poselstwa Józef Cywiak to MSZ in Warsaw, Brussels, 11 October 1954.

37 MSZ Z8 T264 W20, Raport polityczny, 30 August 1951.

38 MSZ Z6 T834 W63, Raport, November 1947.

39 IPN BU 01739/464, Notatka informacyjna dot. Prezesa belgijskiej Partii Liberalnej Roger Motza, 18 October 1952, p. 1.

40 MSZ Z6 T846 W64, Raport polityczny nr 24, 30 September 1948

Senator [Gustaaf] De Stobbeleer and MP Dhaseleer in Alost.”⁴¹ The president of *Les Amitiés belgo-polonaises*, Ernest Demuyter, was also a Liberal.

However, the reader should not generalize or overestimate the Belgian Liberals' engagement with the Polish People's Republic. First, the Republic also had positive relations with other Belgian parties. Contacts with Catholics were labeled as “correct, often with more courtesy than necessary.” Interactions with the Social Democrats were more “stiff and marked by distrust,”⁴² but in other sources individual socialists receive due credit. Louis Piérard, for instance, “manifested friendship for Poland on many occasions.”⁴³

Second, the Poles were not always that enthusiastic about the Belgian Liberals. In December 1948, hardly two months after their appraisal of their relationship with the major Belgian political parties, they wrote that: “In the present system of relations, we cannot count on the support of any political groups other than communists.”⁴⁴ In the months following their charm offensive among Liberals, they had little positive information to report. The names of Destenay, De Stobbeleir, and D'Haeseleer no longer appear in the sources. Even Motz is sometimes depicted as critical of communism; for instance, in February 1949, when he “pointed out to Spaak the rapid growth of the Communist Party.”⁴⁵

Still, at other times Motz clearly sympathized with the Polish People's Republic. It remains unclear how he dovetailed this with his Liberal persuasion. His biographer Joseph Tordoir does not mention this; on the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes that Motz was opposed to class struggle, statism, and dirigisme.⁴⁶ The Brussels manifesto of June 1946, which formed the basis for the ideological program of the Liberal International, is also at odds with Motz's practices:

We oppose every form of Government which fails to guarantee to all its people liberty of conscience, liberty of the press, liberty of association, and of the free expression and publication of their beliefs and opinions.

41 MSZ Z8 T449 W35, Raport Polityczny nr 69, 12 October 1953. Maurice Destenay was the president of the Belgian Liberal Party between 1954 and 1958; Gustaaf De Stobbeleir and Louis D'Haeseleer were indeed Liberals in Aalst.

42 MSZ Z6 T846 W64, Raport polityczny nr 24, 30 September 1948.

43 MSZ Z6 T64 W845, Raport polityczny nr 20, 29 May 1948.

44 MSZ Z6 T846 W64, Raport polityczny nr 26, 2 December 1948.

45 MSZ Z8 T7 W1, Raport polityczny nr 28, 4 February 1949.

46 Joseph Tordoir, “Motz.”

We oppose every reactionary or totalitarian form of government. We assert our faith in political liberty and democracy. [...]

Convinced as we are that the suppression of economic freedom leads inevitably to the disappearance of political freedom, we affirm our confidence in an economic system which respects private initiative, the spirit of enterprise and responsibility.⁴⁷

Not all Liberals adhered to this fine print. There were sometimes discussions within the Liberal International about their attitude towards the people's republics. Eastern European members in exile were firmly against any contact, while some of their Western European allies did not want to altogether rule out the possibility of trade.⁴⁸ Motz, however, went further and had a monopoly with Belgarop. The Liberal Party chairman clearly worked both angles.

Belgian-Polish Economic Relations

The Liberals', and particularly Motz's, sympathy towards the Polish People's Republic, was thus not inspired by any strong ideology. It had a different source of inspiration: trade interests. It, therefore, requires an examination of Belgian-Polish economic relations after World War II and in the early Cold War.

Although Belgium and Poland gradually broke off into two different ideological camps, both countries still maintained economic relations. On August 14, 1946, they signed a new commercial treaty. Belgium needed energy resources to boost its industrial production and to recover its economy, which therefore made it interested in Polish coal. It also hoped for compensations following the Polish communist government's nationalization of a huge share of the Belgian-owned companies in the country. Poland, for its part, aspired for investment credits and trade growth. It opened a trading post in Brussels in January 1947 and gradually expanded commercial activities in Belgium. Apart from coal, it exported potassium salts and textiles. As far as imports, the largest items were dyes, woolen rags, linen, copper, etc. Polish exports to Belgium grew from a value of 908,000 BEF in 1946 to over 244,342,000 BEF in 1947 and 346,039,000 BEF in 1948 (a great deal of which consisted of coal: 174,800,886 BEF in 1947

47 Julie Smith, *A Sense of Liberty. The History of the Liberal International 1947-1997*, London, Liberal International, 1997, pp. 75-76.

48 Ibid., p. 19 and 21.

and 210,800,700 BEF in 1948). Imports expanded from 45,669,000 BEF in 1946 to over 217,259,000 BEF in 1947 and 520,211,000 BEF in 1948. Poland thus faced an increasing trade deficit, which it had to cover with Western currency. It therefore urged negotiations for a new treaty. The discussions started in September 1948, and the new treaty was signed on November 11 of that year. Warsaw thought it was a great success. The agreement increased the Polish capacity by 4.5 times and anticipated the export of each side of approximately 1.15 million BEF including the carbon quota in clearing for a two-year period.⁴⁹

However, the Poles triumphed too early. By that time, developments were beginning to cast a dark shadow over the economic relations between the two countries. First, there was the nationalization of Belgian companies in Poland. In 1946, the Polish Sejm turned key industrial branches into state property. Meanwhile, several Belgian companies, such as Electobel, Solvay, and Polindus, were confiscated by the state. They united in a *Consortium de défense des biens, droits et intérêts belges et luxembourgeois nationalisés en Pologne*, and in 1947 began negotiations for damages. On January 20, 1948, the consortium concluded an agreement with the Polish government. They estimated that Poland owed about 3 billion Belgian francs and decided that it was to pay this partly via Polish coal and partly via credits for investments in Belgian products. However, the Belgian government refused to make taxpayers' money available for credits to Poland and opposed the import of large amounts of Polish coal. The treaty was not signed, and the issue dragged on for many years, jeopardizing trade relations between the two countries all through the 1950s. While Belgium wanted to connect compensation and a trade agreement, Poland wanted to discuss the two issues separately.⁵⁰ Eventually, they finally struck a deal on December 17, 1962.⁵¹

There was a second, closely related problem: Belgium was no longer in need of Polish coal. In 1945 and 1946, Prime Minister Achiel Van Acker fought a so-called "coal war" that gave him the nickname of *Achille Charbon*. Relying on, inter alia, German prisoners-of-war and East European

49 MHZ 94/14, Departament Importu. Wymiana handlowa z Belgią, 1947–1950, Stosunki gospodarcze polsko-belgijskie w ciągu 1948 r., Bruksela, 7 February 1948. The nine pages report is also kept at MSZ Z8 T7 W1.

50 See for instance: MSZ Z6 T848 W64, Notatka, 10 June 1948; MSZ Z8 T317 W25, Raport polityczny nr 57, 31 December 1951; and MSZ Z8 T532 W41, Notatka służbowa, 6 July 1954

51 Koen Coremans, *De verdediging van de Belgische belangen in Polen na WO II*, Unpublished MA Thesis, KU Leuven, 2007, especially pp. 38–43 and 75.

displaced persons, he managed to achieve a great success: coal production grew from 13.5 million tons in 1944 to 22.8 million tons in 1947. This was the basis of a quick recovery, which was also made possible due to the limited damages in the ports of Ghent and Antwerp, which served as American import ports and provided American dollars. The number of unemployed Belgians fell from 300,000 in 1945 to 67,000 in 1947.⁵²

In 1948–1949, however, economic growth began to slow down, and this led to a renewed interest in Polish coal. Polish Ambassador Krajewski wrote in February 1949 that Prime Minister Spaak had told him that Belgium needed to import coal again in order to boost its export.⁵³ However, the following reports from the Polish embassy in Brussels were again less favorable. In April 1949, they noted that the coal mines “cannot agree to import Polish coal [and] will certainly do everything to prevent a contract with us.”⁵⁴ A year later, things had not changed: “The Belgians will strive to import as little Polish coal as possible⁵⁵”.

These developments were in part caused by what proved to be the third big problem for the Poles: growing American involvement in the Belgian (and, more broadly, Western European) economy. On June 5, 1947, the American secretary of state George Marshall launched the idea of a huge economic relief program to Europe known as the Marshall Plan in order to stimulate recovery, raise the living standard, and weaken the position of communist parties in countries such as France and Italy.

On September 22, 1947, sixteen Western European countries subscribed to the program, including Belgium. It received relatively little aid because it was in lesser need, but still profited considerably from the available funds. However, the Marshall Plan aid also affected the country in two other ways.⁵⁶

First, it drew Belgium into the American economic and political sphere of influence. Belgium had to purchase certain products in the United States

52 Karel Veraghtert, “De naoorlogse economie en het Marshallplan 1944–1960”, in: Mark Van den Wijngaert and Lieve Beullens (eds), *Oost West West Best. België onder de Koude Oorlog (1947–1989)*, Tiel, Lannoo, 1997, pp. 68–66; Els Witte, “Tussen restauratie en vernieuwing. Een introductie op de Belgische politieke evolutie tussen 1944 en 1950”, in: Els Witte, Jean-Claude Burgelman and Patrick Stouthuysen (eds), *Tussen restauratie en vernieuwing. Aspecten van de Belgische naoorlogse politiek (1944–1950)*, Brussel, VUB Press, 1989, pp. 27–28.

53 MSZ Z8 T7 W1, Raport polityczny nr 28, 4 February 1949.

54 MSZ Z8 T7 W1, Raport polityczny, 4 April 1949.

55 MSZ Z8 T132 W9, Notatka, March 1950.

56 Karel Veraghtert, “De naoorlogse economie”, art. cit., pp. 73–81.

or other countries of the European Recovery Program and was increasingly discouraged from maintaining trade relations with Eastern European countries. Especially in the early 1950s, the Poles complained about growing American pressure. In 1950, they noted that “economic relations increasingly diminish as a result of the application of restrictions by Belgium under the general Atlantic ordinances.”⁵⁷

The following year, they complained that “the American screw on the Belgian economy is being tightened more and more. Agents of the American FBI shamelessly scour the entire Antwerp port, order Belgian customs officers to stop trucks in the street and conduct searches and check port warehouses and ship loads. Polish ships are very often surrounded by gendarmes, who control all traffic to and from the ship. Obtaining an export license for the countries of people’s democracy is becoming more and more difficult for Belgian manufacturers.”⁵⁸ In 1952, they wrote that “merchants who specialize in crossing over this wall ‘to the left’ do not hide their annoyance at being added to secret blacklists by American controllers in Belgium and being denounced to the Sureté as crypto-communists, agents of states behind the Iron Curtain, etc.”⁵⁹

As a result, Belgian exports to Eastern Europe fell from 8.5 percent of total exports in 1938 to 3.0 percent in 1950. However, the Marshall Plan also undermined Belgium’s economic position in a second way. It granted much greater aid to Belgium’s neighboring countries, boosted their economies, and allowed them to quickly catch up with the prewar level. From the late 1940s onwards, Belgium suffered dramatically from competition with the Dutch port of Rotterdam and a modernized West German industry. While it was considered a “miracle” in the first years after the war, it grew into a “sick man of Europe” by the 1950s.⁶⁰

Early on, Belgian industrialists became aware of this threat. Already in August 1948, the Polish embassy in Brussels wrote that “in Belgian economic circles there is a clear, and I would say, determined attitude towards deepening economic relations with Poland. [...] There is noticeable reserve in political circles as a direct reaction to the provisions of the ‘Marshallian’ agreement.”⁶¹

57 MSZ Z8 T264 W20, Raport polityczny nr 47, 15 December 1950.

58 MSZ Z8 T264 W20, Raport polityczny nr 53, 2 August 1951.

59 MSZ Z8 T317 W25, Raport polityczny nr 58, 4 February 1952.

60 Karel Veraghtert, “De naoorlogse economie”, art. cit., p. 80, 71, and 81.

61 MSZ Z6 T846 W64, Raport polityczny nr 22, 3 August 1948.

Their pressure led to a new treaty being signed on April 13, 1950,⁶² but due to the flaring Cold War, it did not revive trade between the two countries. As a result, the Polish embassy noted “a large influx of local merchants and industrialists offering their goods”⁶³ and observed that “in view of the increasing difficulties for Belgian exports on international markets, the pressure of Belgian industry on the government has increased.”⁶⁴

Again, the Belgian government started negotiations. On January 11, 1954, Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland solemnly and personally signed two additional protocols to the existing treaty, expanding the trade between the two countries.⁶⁵ The treaty was systematically prolonged but expired by 1956. In that year, it was noted, “trade between Poland and Belgium in principle takes place without any specific link to the treaty. The Belgians, when issuing both import and export licenses, do not make any special difficulties with goods not covered by the treaty’s goods lists. The decisive factor in exporting our goods to Belgium is the demand for these goods on the local market and whether our prices correspond to the level of competitive prices.”⁶⁶ In June 1957, a delegation of Belgian industrialists and engineers traveled to Poland, and in May 1958, the *Fédération de l’Industrie Belge* even considered the establishment of an office in Warsaw.⁶⁷

However, all of this does not mean that trade numbers grew. On the contrary, Polish exports to Belgium remained modest all throughout the 1950s, reaching a high of 44 million rubles in 1951, then quickly leveling off to a disappointing 25 million by 1958 (compared to 43 million in 1938).⁶⁸ The import statistics of Belgian products to Poland show a greater fluctuation: from 36 million in 1950 to 67 million by 1958.⁶⁹

It is in this context that one can understand the Belgian Liberal Party’s, and particularly Roger Motz’s, interest in the Polish People’s Republic. Although the communist ideology was at odds with his ideas about free

62 MSZ Z8 T265 W20, *Légation de Belgique* to the Foreign Office in Warsaw, 8 March 1951.

63 MSZ Z8 T317 W25, *Raport polityczny* nr 61, 7 July 1952.

64 MSZ Z8 T449 W35, *Raport polityczny* nr 67, 8 June 1953.

65 MSZ Z8 T535 W41, *Raport polityczny* nr 72, 18 January 1954.

66 MSZ Z8 T265 W20, *Notatka*, 5 December 1956.

67 MSZ Z8 T788 W57, *Notatka w sprawie polsko-belgijskich stosunków gospodarczych*, 11 October 1957 and letter from the MHZ to the MSZ, Warsaw, 12 May 1958.

68 MHZ, 19/2, *Wydz. Sprawozdawczości. Handel Zagraniczny w latach 1938, 1945–1958. Opracowanie – eksport w układzie geograficznym 1959 r., „Belgia”*.

69 MHZ, 19/1, *Wydz. Sprawozdawczości. Handel Zagraniczny w latach 1938, 1945–1958. Opracowanie – import w układzie geograficznym 1959 r., „Belgia”*.

trade and democracy, he wanted to strengthen ties with the Polish People's Republic to improve his trade opportunities.

Motz himself was not actively involved in the negotiations on the official level. His name does not appear on a 1948 list of over twenty Belgian industrialists who had a potential interest in the Polish market.⁷⁰ Nor was he part of any delegations that negotiated treaties with Poland.⁷¹ However, we cannot underestimate his role. He publicly advocated for good relations with the Polish People's Republic. He silently consulted with the Polish embassy on the outcome of official visits from economic delegations.⁷² And, finally, he had personal interests, being involved in trade companies working with Poland.

The Société Internationale de Commerce

The report from Motz's file at the secret services that is extensively quoted mentions three companies through which Motz traded with Poland: SIC, Belgarop, and Converters. It also lists four Polish trade "centrals" (head offices) with which they collaborated. Dalspo was a state-owned cooperative enterprise of foreign trade; Ciech an import-export central of chemicals and chemical apparatus; Animex an import and export central of products and preparations of animal origin; and Rolimpex a central for foreign trade that specialized in agricultural products. It is impossible to completely reconstruct the trade between all these companies and determine to what extent Motz's enterprises indeed had a monopoly, as suggested in the secret services' report. However, the Belgian government gazette *Moniteur belge* and the archives of the Brussels Registry of Corporations and the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade can shed much light on the matter.

SIC was the abbreviation of *Société Internationale de Commerce* (International Commercial Company). It was registered as a public company (société anonyme) on November 25, 1947, and "aimed at all commercial operations, in Belgium as well as abroad." The wholesaler Raphaël Hollander had 3,620 shares of 1,000 Belgian Francs, the lawyer Jules Lomme owned 1,151 shares, the traders Adrien Gosseries and Félicien Chapuis had

70 MSZ Z6 T848 W64, Aide-mémoire, s.d. [1948].

71 E.g., MSZ Z8 T132 W9, Légation de Belgique aan MBZ in Warschau, 3 March 1950 or MSZ Z8 T788 W57, Notatka w sprawie polsko-belgijskich stosunków gospodarczych, 11 October 1957

72 MSZ Z8 T788 W57, Notatka w sprawie polsko-belgijskich stosunków gospodarczych, 11 October 1957.

100 shares each, their colleague Etienne Lenoir had 10 shares, and Aristide Coclet and Maurice Delhayé owned 5 shares apiece. Three of them – Hollander, Gosseries, and Lenoir – were administrators, while Coclet was appointed commissioner.⁷³ Neither Motz nor Hauptman are among the participants, but it cannot be ruled out that they knew some of the shareholders, who were all based in Brussels. The same goes for Ferdman, whom the intelligence report mentions as a major financier, due to whose receivership SIC was dissolved.

Furthermore, neither Motz, Hauptman, nor Ferdman are mentioned in subsequent years, when SIC regularly returned to notarize official modifications. After Lenoir had resigned on February 18, 1948, the general board appointed Chapuis administrator and director on November 10, 1948. On September 9, 1949, the general board decided to reduce the capital by depreciating the shares' value from 1,000 to 200 Belgian francs. Just a month later, on October 17, 1949, Gosseries handed in his notice; the general board of August 4, 1949, replaced him with Defrancq. At the end of that year, on December 21, 1949, the administrative council decided to move the SIC's seat from the Rue d'Angleterre 50 to the Rue de la Régence 19, both in Brussels. A year later, however, on December 22, 1950, all the shareholders decided to dissolve the company after it had appeared impossible to present the annual balance sheet. The board assigned a liquidator, who completed his commission on September 10, 1955. Thus, the Société Internationale de Commerce was short-lived.⁷⁴

SIC's balance sheet of June 30, 1949, does not provide much detail into its commercial activities. The company made a profit of 873,033 BEF but did not report its origin and had a debt of the same amount, caused by *inter alia* "general costs."⁷⁵ The company appears in Polish sources, but only very sporadically. More specifically, it left some tracks in the archives of Ciech, the state company trading chemicals. SIC represented Ciech in Belgium starting December 1, 1948, only half a month after Warsaw and Brussels had signed a new trade agreement.⁷⁶

73 *Annexe au Moniteur belge. Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 21706, 11 December 1947, pp. 2337–2340.

74 *Annexe au Moniteur belge. Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 4173, 21–22 March 1949, p. 2808; n° 18978, 24 September 1949, pp. 2761–2762; n° 21991, 20 November 1949, p. 1596; n° 1700, 29 January 1950, p. 1213; n° 3814, 13–14 March 1950, p. 2503; n° 1301, 24 January 1951, p. 879; n° 24581, 24 September 1955, p. 3125.

75 *Annexe au Moniteur belge. Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 19558, 6 October 1949, p. 129.

76 MHZ 7/23, p. 401, Dep. Organizacyjny Wydz. Central. Ciech. Centrala Importowo-Eksportowa. Sprawozdania z działalności, plan etatów, korespondencja. Tom

Belgium was not a lucrative market, however. There was little potential for most of the products that were listed in the treaty. For instance, there was little demand for montan wax, huge competition for naphthalene, and no need for sodium dichromate, which Belgium produced at home. Ciech tried to sell turpentine via SIC but failed because of the divergence of prices. It therefore concluded that the single marketable product was charcoal.⁷⁷ Indeed, the only report that details transactions with SIC notes a sale of charcoal and coal (between June and September 1949; the report of November and December 1948 mentions SIC but states that it has not received any clearings yet; the report from January-March 1949 does not mention SIC at all).⁷⁸ This is not surprising: Belgium was one of the cradles of the second industrial revolution and the home country of Baekeland and Solvay.

More important here is the fact that these documents undermine the intelligence report in at least three ways. First, SIC's monopoly is all but exceptional. Ciech – and other Polish state enterprises – always worked with representatives abroad. In mid-1949, it had nineteen of such companies, generally one per country (only in Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey did it collaborate with two local firms).⁷⁹

Second, trade was very limited. In the summer of 1949, Ciech realized a turnover of 970 dollars in Belgium, which is a fraction of its sales in, for instance, the Netherlands, which amounted to more than 150,000 dollars.

Finally, one may wonder to what extent SIC was Ciech's sole spokesman in Belgium. The archives also mention other companies. In the first months of 1949, for instance, SIC concluded contracts with Rector Demulder, Louis Deenschutter, Entreprises Declin, Chemacid, J. Beeckman, and La File Lumine.⁸⁰ In the autumn of that year, it struck a deal with the Belgian company Techimex, importing superphosphate from Portugal in exchange for Polish coal.⁸¹ In December, it did the same with

II, Wykaz aktualnych umów przedstawicielskich Ciech-u na zagranicę, na dzień 15.6.1949.

77 MHZ 7/22, *idem*, Tom I, p. 365ff., Letter to the MHZ, 31 March 1949.

78 MHZ 7/22, pp. 208–212, Sprawozdania z działalności przedstawicieli zagranicznych CIECH-u, 1 January–31 March 1949; MHZ 7/22, 478: *idem*, 1 November–31 December 1948; MHZ 7/24, *idem*, Tom III, 145: *idem*, 1 June–1 October 1949.

79 MHZ 7/23, p. 401, Wykaz aktualnych umów przedstawicielskich Ciech-u na zagranicę, na dzień 15.6.1949.

80 MHZ 7/22, p. 368, Zestawienie kontraktów zawartych z firmami belgijskimi, s.d. [31 March 1949]

81 MHZ 7/23, p. 13, Nota Biura Kontroli MHZ, Warsaw, 27 September 1949 and MHZ 7/24, 130, Nota, Warszawa, 21 October 1949.

Dieschburg & Cigrang, exchanging coal for dyes and dry paints.⁸² All these companies may have been clients of SIC, which may have acted as an in-between with Ciech. However, in March 1949 there were also contacts with the Antwerp Worker Cooperative (Société Coopérative) Metro about the export of Polish herbs via Antwerp to the rest of the world. Metro acted as a commission agent and accordingly seems to have been a competitor of SIC.⁸³

Along with the fact that none of these sources mention Motz or Hauptman, nor suggest that the former received a 20 percent share of SIC's profits, these findings fail to confirm the statements of the intelligence report. Simultaneously, they do not convincingly contradict it. In fact, they validate some details in the report: the years of creation ("the end of 1947") and dissolution ("1950") and the name of one of the shareholders ("Lomme"). But for a more accurate check, an inquiry into the other company, Belgarop, is necessary.

Belgarop and Converters

According to the above-quoted report from 1952 in Motz's intelligence file, "in September 1950, Motz together with Karol created a new company for business with Poland – Belgarop, in which Motz is the general manager and Karol its director." This does not seem accurate. Belgarop was created on 23 March 1951, and Motz did not participate in the company. There were seven other shareholders, and only one of them, Aristide Coclet, had also been part of SIC. Like Maurice Distenfeld, Victor Moreau, and André Gros-Burdet, he had only two shares. Gaston Bergé had ten, Paul Mention thirty, and all the rest – 152 shares or more than three quarters – were in the hands of Jan Hauptman. The former press attaché had a controlling share in the company. Together with Mention and Bergé, he was also an administrator. In addition, Mention was made president of the administrative council. Just as in SIC, Coclet became commissioner. The objectives of Belgarop resembled those of SIC: "The company aimed at all operations related to the purchase and the sale – cash, on credit or on commission – import, export or transit of all tradable products."⁸⁴

However, things changed on October 16, 1952, when the "Société Commerciale 'Belgarop'" was transformed from a public company

82 MHZ 7/24, p. 38, Nota, 21 December 1949.

83 MHZ 7/22, pp. 413–414, Letters of 8 March and 21 March 1949.

84 *Annexe au Moniteur belge. Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 6156, 14 April 1951, pp. 871–872.

(société anonyme) into a private limited liability company (société privée à responsabilité limitée), in which stock was not for sale on open markets. The objectives remained the same, and so did its social capital, but the owners changed. Jan Hauptman kept control with 134 shares, but the remaining sixty-six shares went into the hands of one single person: Roger Motz.⁸⁵ Then the chairman of the Belgian Liberal Party ceases to appear in the official sources. Only Hauptman held an official position, namely manager, and is mentioned in several changes of address.⁸⁶ In 1956 and 1970, he gave power of attorney to a certain Franz Six.⁸⁷ Still, it is clear that Hauptman and Motz were doing business together in Belgarop.

Poland was a client. Again, it is impossible to reconstruct all the trade activity. However, a file in the archives of the ministry of Foreign Trade on transactions with Belgium in 1955 occasionally mentions Belgarop, which acquired potato flour from Rolimpex at least three times, once in exchange for wool rags for Textilimport in Lodz, a second time for root for batteries for Ciech, and a third time as a straight purchase.⁸⁸

However, Belgarop does not seem to have had a monopoly. It was not involved in Rolimpex's trade of flowers with A. Longeval in the Belgian community Deux-Acren, for example.⁸⁹ Moreover, just as with SIC, there were other players. In the exchange of crude palm oil from the Belgian Congo from the Compagnie d'Anvers to Rolimpex, and for cotton textiles from Cetebe in Lodz to various Congolese companies, there were two other agents: Roger Galère for the palm oil trade, and Converters for the textiles.⁹⁰ The same agents also coordinated the trade of coffee from the Brussels company Sedec to Rolimpex and of cotton textiles from Cetebe and enameled dishes from Metalexport, both to Sedec.⁹¹ Converters, based in

85 *Annexe au Moniteur belge. Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 23907, 6 November 1952, pp. 1267–1268.

86 On 27 April 1951, Belgarop moved from Rue de Stassart 20–22 to Boulevard Général Jacques 20 (*Annexe au Moniteur belge: Sociétés Commerciales*, n° 16328, 18 May 1951, p. 3173); in 1956, it moved to Boulevard St. Michel 125, and in 1963 to Avenue de la Folle Chanson 2. See ABH (ARA, DJC).

87 ABH (ARA, DJC), Letters from 31 May 1956 (with a heading of Belgarop) and 14 December 1970.

88 MHZ 48/10, Dep. Importu. Transakcje związane z... Belgią... Zestawienia towarów, notatki, 1954–1955, pp. 95–183. Belgarop is mentioned on pages 179–178 and 175, 174, 157 and 153–150.

89 MHZ 48/10, p. 180, 170 and 166.

90 MHZ 48/10, p. 163, 162 and 159.

91 MHZ 48/10, p. 149, 148, 147, 144, 142, 137 and 133.

Ghent, also purchased from Cetebe cotton textiles and vicugna wool produced by the Brussels-based Italian Commercial Trading Company.⁹²

Converters appears in the above-quoted report as the third company through which Motz channeled his business with Poland, but we have not found more information on it. No tracks were left in the government gazette *Moniteur belge* or in the archives of the Registry of Corporations in Brussels and Ghent.⁹³ It is briefly mentioned in an intelligence report in Hauptman's file, which however suggests some hostility on the part of Converters. On January 27, 1951, Hauptman wrote that "three months ago, Dogilewski, Glaser, and Converters spread rumors that I was setting up a communist-espionage outpost under the guise of a trading company."⁹⁴ Converters was bracketed together with two leaders of the Polish anti-communist community in Belgium: Marcelli Dogilewski, the head of the Jewish desk in the Ministry of Information of the Polish government-in-exile in London during World War II, and Stefan Glaser, the last non-communist Polish ambassador in Belgium (he also remained active within Christian Democratic and anti-communist circles in the following decades).⁹⁵ This is entirely at odds with the idea that Converters was an instrument of Motz and Hauptman. However, we cannot elaborate on this as the sources are too scarce.

Regarding Belgarop, by contrast, Hauptman's file has much more information than the archives of the Brussels Registry of Corporations or those of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade. They allow us to get a better understanding of its position.

The earliest document that mentions Belgarop dates from September 9, 1950, more than half a year before Belgarop was founded.⁹⁶ In a letter to the Polish secret services, Hauptman announces that he will establish the trade company. "Motz will be its general administrator, and I will be its

92 MHZ 48/10, pp. 123–122, 116 and 105.

93 Information from Olivier Van Weyenbergh (ARA, DJC) and from Marleen Noppe and Paul Drossens (State Archive of Beveren).

94 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Karol [Jan Hauptman] to Obyw. Szumski, Bruksela, 27 January 1951.

95 David Engel, *Facing a Holocaust. The Polish Government-in-Exile and the Jews, 1943–1945*, Chapel Hill and London, University of North Carolina Press, 1993; Idesbald Goddeeris, "Stefan Glaser: Collaborator in European Umbrella Organizations," in: Michel Dumoulin and Idesbald Goddeeris (eds.), *Integration or representation? Polish exiles in Belgium and the European construction*, Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2005, pp. 79–98.

96 This undoubtedly also explains why the report from Motz file, quoted in the beginning of this article, gives September 1950 as Belgarop's foundation date.

director. This will immediately give me a social position in the eyes of Belgians. ‘Directeur Général de la Société S.A.’ means more on a visit card than ‘Embassy Attaché.’ This company will trade with all countries. We have no illusions that this will bring many earnings outside Poland. However, we have to keep appearances in the eyes of the Belgians and try to trade with everyone.” Hauptman was not very optimistic: “Motz will receive the representation of five Polish central companies on January 1, 1951. This is not a lot. [...] This trade will be difficult due to competition, especially with other countries. [...] For me, the hardest period will be after I leave the embassy, in three or four months, as the company will not yet have any income, and therefore I would like you to help me during this period.”⁹⁷

The next document dates from May 3, 1951. The intelligence learned from Hauptman that Belgarop had been established, but that things did not go as planned. Motz remained completely in the dark and worked with a confidential advisor, the “famous industrialist” Mention. So far, Belgarop had mostly sold flax to Poland. It only traded with Polimex, a central that is not mentioned in other sources, and had not yet had any offers or orders from other Polish companies, such as Ciech and Varimex. According to the intelligence, Hauptman was not determined to represent these institutions, and contrarily aimed towards broadening his activities to Western countries and colonies in order to avoid the reputation of a company that only did business with Poland.⁹⁸ This never succeeded. Even by 1963, Belgarop “officially acts as a company trading with various countries, but in practice its activity is limited to maintaining commercial contacts with Poland.”⁹⁹

Hauptman’s other plans were not immediately realized, either. By October 1952, the Polish trade centrals – not only Varimex but also Dalspo, Animex, Ciech, and Rolimpex – had all terminated their collaboration with Belgarop. They thought that Hauptman had poorly defended their interests and were convinced by the Polish commercial attaché in Brussels and by the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Warsaw. The decision was problematic: Belgarop lost its reason for existence, while Hauptman lost his cover.¹⁰⁰ The secret services therefore sent the head of the I Section’s

97 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Sportowiec [Jan Hauptman] to the headquarters, Bruksela, 9 September 1950.

98 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Sprawozdanie z podróży służbowej odbytej w dniach 13–17. IV.1951 r., Warszawa, 3 May 1951, p. 3.

99 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna dot. firmy Belgarop, Warszawa, 9 May 1963.

100 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan nawiązania kontaktu i rozmowy z agentem „Karolem”, Warszawa, 22 October 1952, p. 3 and 7.

VII Department, Lieutenant Colonel Mackiewicz, to Brussels. Mackiewicz went to the commercial attaché, who told him that he had changed his mind.

The collaboration with other companies over the previous months had convinced him that Hauptman had a better knowledge of the field and was able to sell products that had little demand. Mackiewicz also talked to Hauptman, who emphasized that Belgarop's problems prevented him from efficient intelligence work and therefore urged for re-established collaboration with at least one Polish central. Mackiewicz replied that the secret services could not take measures that harmed Polish trade interests and that they wanted to condition good intelligence work on a good turnover of Belgarop and preferred to "pay money depending on the value of information received and regardless of Belgarop's profits."¹⁰¹ Still, the secret services were ambiguous. They also suggested that Karol should "tactfully make Motz understand that the renewal of cooperation by the Polish headquarters with Belgarop was only because of the intelligence provided."¹⁰²

In subsequent years, several reports suggest a more explicit relationship between the secret services' interference and Belgarop's activities. In July 1954, the secret services called Belgarop's profits their "main asset."¹⁰³ In February 1955, they noted that Belgarop "initially brought them insignificant income due to limited commercial opportunities, mainly with Poland. For this reason, Szejka initially had a grudge against Karol and was reluctant to provide him with the information we requested. The change in this situation came as a result of our interest in this matter and by enabling the Belgarop company broader trade turnovers with our agencies. Since then, the company's income has grown significantly and now stands at around 200,000 BEF monthly."¹⁰⁴ Later reports reiterated this view. One from January 1959, for instance, added "with our help, of course" and concluded that "since then, the company's revenues have increased significantly, which had a direct impact on Karol and Szejka's work for us."¹⁰⁵

However, this does not mean that the secret services had Motz and Hauptman under their thumb. On the contrary, when Hauptman reduced

101 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, Warszawa, 18 December 1952, p. 1 and 9.

102 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan nawiązania kontaktu i rozmowy z agentem „Karolem”, Warszawa, 22 October 1952, p. 11.

103 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan pracy dla ag. Karol, Warszawa, 8 July 1954, p. 7.

104 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan spotkania pracownika Centrali z agentem Karol, Warszawa, 10 February 1955, pp. 1–2.

105 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 10 January 1959, pp. 1–2.

his collaboration after a couple of years and passed on less and less information, they were not able to use Belgarop as a leverage. A report from 1960 has the clearest description of the situation:

The management decided to terminate cooperation with him and gradually cut Belgarop's transactions with our foreign trade centrals.

According to the data from the trade attaché, pointed out by the rezydentura, the elimination of Belgarop from intermediating in our trade with Belgium is a very difficult matter due to the difficulties of selling our products, such as potato preparations, dried chicory, and artificial fertilizers on the Belgian market. Karol's company currently has a representative office for the sale of Rolimpex products in Belgium, the number of which planned for the next season includes transactions for a total of 62 million BEF. In addition, Ciech sells, through Belgarop, fertilizers. Currently, a transaction for a total of 4 million BEF is pending. According to data from the trade attaché, Ciech is not able to sell chemical fertilizers in Belgium without the intervention of Belgarop.

In the event of an immediate termination of the transactions with Belgarop, the intervention of the Ambassador and the Commercial Counselor, with whom Motz and Karol are still in close relations, is possible.¹⁰⁶

In other words, Hauptman and Motz had played their cards well and used the secret services to expand their trade. The latter saw through their plans quite early but appeared to be powerless. Hauptman "carried out many transactions to our disadvantage, for example in 1955 he delivered flax of very poor quality for Textilimport, despite complaints following the first delivery."¹⁰⁷ They made efforts to "influence the nature and quantity of the transactions. Apart from 'intervention' in favor of the company, there were also attempts to reduce the turnovers. These cases took place until 1956. Since then, there have been no interventions on our part."¹⁰⁸ A year later, in 1957, the secret services wanted to put an end to this situation:

Our interventions in the company's affairs are inadvisable, harmful, and completed. [...]

¹⁰⁶ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, p. 12.

¹⁰⁷ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna dot. Jana Hauptmana – dyrektora i współwłaściciela Belgaropu w Brukseli, Warszawa, 20 February 1960, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna dot. firmy Belgarop, Warszawa, 9 May 1963, p. 3.

Such a solution of the case will allow us to break away from the case of Karol's company at once. This will enable us to focus on the operational work with Karol. Besides, Karol will be deprived of the possibility of blackmailing us and, on the other hand, we will be able to check his honesty and good will towards us. [...]

I propose to conduct the meeting in a calm but firm and decisive tone. Karol must leave this meeting with the conviction that he will not be able to get any more free money from us.¹⁰⁹

However, the secret services were not successful. Five years later they were still thinking and acting within the same framework. In order to reactivate Hauptman's work, they considered "not just to threaten, but to actually sever business contacts with his and Szejka's company via Rolimpex and Ciech or possibly via one of these companies and to clearly state that his monopoly and commission are closely related to the reliable execution of the tasks we set to him."¹¹⁰ A year later, however, they instructed that "the issue of cooperation should be clearly distinguished from his commercial activity."¹¹¹

Altogether, it is clear that one should not overestimate the Polish secret services' influence over Motz and Hauptman's trade companies. It is true that the secret services' interventions from December 1952 onwards boosted Belgarop's turnover and convinced its owners to expand their intelligence work.

However, there are many elements that put the extensively quoted report from Motz's file into perspective. The first company, SIC, did not have Hauptman and Motz among its shareholders, failed to develop a flourishing trade with Poland, and may not have even had a monopoly in representing Polish trade centrals in Belgium. The second company, Converters, left no trace in official sources and is represented as an anti-communist element in Hauptman's file. The third company, Belgarop, meanwhile, did business with Poland so successfully that it went beyond the secret services' control. They did not manipulate Hauptman. On the contrary, it was Hauptman who manipulated them.

109 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka służbowa dot. agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 15 November 1957, p. 9.

110 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka służbowa dot. współpracy z Karolem, Warszaw, 19 March 1962, p. 3.

111 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Instrukcja..., Warszawa, 7 February 1963.

Hauptman was not a defenseless spy in the hands of the Polish security apparatus, but an opportunistic diplomat (who first worked for the Polish government in London and then for the communists in Warsaw) and crafty businessman. He also led other companies in which the secret services had no grip at all. In December 1955, he founded the Société Belge de Transactions Commerciales Trabelco. The company had the same objectives as Belgarop and wanted to export, import, and distribute all tradable products. Initially, Hauptman had a co-manager, the Antwerp businessman Fernand Schmit, but after his resignation in 1963, he was the sole owner.¹¹² The secret services knew about the company: “The Trabelco company is also owned by Hauptman. It is formally the recipient when Belgarop acts as an agent on commission. In this case, Trabelco deals with the distribution of goods and collects the profits resulting from the trade margin. The establishment of this company was dictated by the desire to reduce the tax burden. Both companies are exclusively Hauptman’s show.”¹¹³ But it did not have any hold on it.

Remuneration from the Secret Services

It is evident that Hauptman was the linchpin of the companies as well as the contacts between Motz and the secret services. However, what remains unclear is what remuneration Motz and Hauptman received from the secret services.

Regarding Motz, the second report in his file, dating from September 1955, provides the most details.

As for Motz’s financial situation, it is not great. Motz has no personal assets. But his expenses to support his fairly intense political activity are quite large, amounting to about 50,000 Belgian francs per month. Motz’s income is also within the same range (he gets 10,000 BEF from the Senate, about 20,000 BEF from Belgarop, and approximately the same amount from the Jacques Destop company, with which he is connected and from which he receives a 1 percent commission), but his income is subject to some fluctuations, since it depends on the volume of transactions of the above companies. That is why

¹¹² ABH (ARA, DJC), referring to publications in the *Moniteur belge* from 1–3 January 1956 (n° 160) and 18 April 1963 (n° 7923).

¹¹³ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna dot. firmy Belgarop, Warszawa, 9 May 1963, p. 6. Another report lists several Belgian companies Trabelco traded with (id. Sprawa firmy Belgarop oraz Trabelce w Brukseli, s.d., authored by Wiesław).

he is very much interested in improving his financial situation and, from the very beginning of his appearance on the political scene, he has been trying to use his influence and connections to his personal advantage. [...]

For the information he provides us, Motz receives a 20 percent commission on Belgarop's income, which has amounted so far to an average of 20,000 BEF when our relations with Belgarop were normal. Recently, following the reduction of our business transactions with Belgarop, Motz is feeling this significantly and is thus particularly keen on improving this situation.¹¹⁴

According to this report, Motz pocketed a monthly sum that was the double his fee as senator. Today, this remuneration for espionage would be more than 10,000 EUR. Of course, Motz did not receive it in such a straightforward manner. His income depended on Belgarop's turnover. He also, however, abused his power and knowledge to increase the profits of his company. At the same time, this report raises questions, because Belgarop was not dependent on the secret services and the Foreign Trade Ministry archives do not have evidence of manipulation. It is also remarkable that profits were higher in years of less intensive intelligence work: 200,000 BEF per month in 1954, 185,000 BEF in 1956, and 250,000 BEF in 1959.¹¹⁵

There are more details about Hauptman's pay. An agent who traveled to meet Hauptman in April 1951 decided that as long as he works for Belgarop, he would receive 7,000 BEF monthly for operational spending and that the central would pay his mother a further 1,000 PLN every month.¹¹⁶ An analysis from February 1957 provides the same amounts and adds that in sum, "we spent 621,000 BEF for Karol's salary; 25,500 BEF for operational costs; and 69,000 PLN for his mother in Poland."¹¹⁷ In 1960, the total paid salary alone amounted to 726,000 BEF (and his mother's compensation reached 88,000 PLN).¹¹⁸ His profits from Belgarop were even greater. In 1954, the company had a turnover from trade with Poland of 240 million

¹¹⁴ IPN BU 01739/464, Raport o zezwolenie na werbunek Motz Roger, Warszawa, 12 September 1955, p. 3 and 5.

¹¹⁵ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka instrukcyjna..., 30 September 1949; Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8.3.1960, p. 10.

¹¹⁶ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Sprawozdanie z podróży służbowej odbytej w dniach 13–17. IV.1951 r., Warszawa, 3 May 1951, p. 2.

¹¹⁷ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Analiza sprawy agenturalnej ps. Karol, Warszawa, 4 February 1957, p. 2.

¹¹⁸ IPN BU 003195/11/D, Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, p. 11.

BEF; in the first eight months of 1956, this was 111 million BEF, of which Hauptman received a provision of 2,980,000 BEF.¹¹⁹ In 1963, the secret services concluded that “it is beyond doubt that Hauptman has made a great fortune from his trade with Poland.”¹²⁰

In the late 1950s, the secret services wanted to end regular support of Hauptman’s business and instead pay per piece of information. This happened at least once: in March 1958, they gave him 10,000 BEF for original materials on the meetings of the Bilderberg Group.¹²¹ However, we do not know how much of this money was eventually transferred to Motz. We indeed do not know of any direct source on the relation between Hauptman and Motz nor any direct source from Motz himself. The Polish secret services did not have direct contact with the latter.

In several instances, the headquarters in Warsaw considered getting in touch with Motz. In 1952, they contemplated recruiting him during his visit to Poland with other Belgian MPs. Although this did not happen, they did not abandon the idea. The 1955 report in Motz’s file was in fact a request for recruitment and contains a “plan for a conversation” with him. Still, in 1959, they wanted to check whether a direct meeting with him would be possible. As they noted in 1960, however, Karol did everything to prevent this. “This is understandable, because without Motz, Karol would not have any added value for us.” As a result, Karol would lose money. In 1959, the secret services had suggested paying Szejka a monthly award of 40,000 BEF and Karol only 15,000.¹²²

Conclusion

All in all, this chapter does not shed positive light on Roger Motz. He never directly collaborated with the Polish secret services, but in his contacts with the Polish People’s Republic’s representatives in Belgium, he

119 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka służbowa dot. agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 15 November 1957, p. 3.

120 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Notatka informacyjna dot. firmy Belgarop, Warszawa, 9 May 1963, p. 6.

121 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 10 January 1959, p. 2 and Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 6 June 1960, p. 3.

122 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Raport ze spotkania z Karolem, 18 December 1952, p. 14; Plan odbycia kontrolnego spotkania z ag. ps. Karol, Warszawa, 10 January 1959, p. 4; Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, p. 9; IPN BU 01739/464, Raport o zezwolenie na werbunek Motz Roger, Warszawa, 12 September 1955, pp. 6–7.

consciously mixed his own interests with those of his party and his political activities. Moreover, he received significant material compensation.

Motz's liaison with the Polish secret services, Jan Hauptman, was even more involved in this web of backstabbing, intrigue, and deceit. Remarkably, Hauptman also manipulated the Polish secret services: certainly, with his business and perhaps in the political sphere as well. At one point, the Polish intelligence services felt blackmailed by Hauptman. They also suspected Hauptman of not telling everything he knew: "Motz does not obtain the more serious profits from the Belgarop company run by Karol (Karol probably – such was the opinion of 'Wiktor' – cheats Motz in the settlement of profits)."¹²³ From this perspective, Motz was also a victim. In his file, there are also details and gossip about his love life.

However, he is not a sympathetic figure. Motz regularly and to several people – including the independent Frank in 1963 – offered information. In this way, he tried to maintain clout with the embassy. He did not need to be blackmailed or misled: he gave the information on his own initiative, voluntarily and deliberately.

At worst, Motz was a snitch and a schemer; at best, he was a simple opportunist and a profiteer. In fact, it matters little. For Belgians, it is painful that a politician from a generation so often regarded as immaculate, charismatic, and exemplary has fallen from his pedestal. For Poles, it is even worse. They will see this as a confirmation of the Yalta betrayal. Not only did Churchill and Roosevelt sell Poland to Stalin; now it also appears that individual Western politicians have made money off the new geopolitical order.

123 IPN BU 003195/11/D, Analiza sprawy agenta ps. Karol, Warszawa, 8 March 1960, p. 9.

