Moving Past Fear and Secular Control: Reimagining Normative Democratic Theory with Pragmatic Neutrality, a Utilitarian Metaethics of Religion, and the Ethos of Reconciled Difference

Abstract

Liberal democracies frequently grapple with fears arising from religious pluralism and its perceived potential to disrupt the secular public order. Post-Enlightenment normative democratic theories, notably those advanced by John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Robert Audi, implicitly or explicitly reflect a deep-seated anxiety about religion’s role in public discourse. This fear manifests through stringent requirements for secular rationality, effectively marginalizing religious reasoning from democratic deliberation. Critically engaging with this underlying fear, the article proposes a partial reconfiguration of normative democratic theory. Drawing on contemporary philosophical discussions and the social teachings of Pope John Paul II, it introduces three perspectives: (1) pragmatic neutrality as an alternative to strict secularism, ensuring genuine freedom and equality; (2) a utilitarian metaethics of religion that evaluates religious communities based on their tangible social contributions; and (3) an ethos of reconciled difference that prioritizes forgiveness, solidarity, and dialogue over perpetual agonistic conflicts. Together, these proposals offer a constructive pathway beyond fear-based limitations, fostering a more inclusive, resilient, and ethically robust democratic framework.